In this paper we identify the main determinants of the exchange rate regimes in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs). For this purpose, we use an ordered logit model for the official (de jure) and the actual (de facto) exchange rate classifications. We find that trade openness and concentration, inflation differentials, international reserves stocks, and financial conditions are the main determinants of the exchange rate regimes in CEECs.
whether the IMF classification does reflect their actual exchange rate strategies.
Alternatively, CEECs' exchange rate regime choices might have been influenced by other criteria than the traditional macroeconomic characteristics. In particular, during the last ten years, these countries experienced major economic and political changes. The first phase of the transition process towards the market economy included the liberalization of prices and trade. In the second half of the 1990s, the CEECs made significant progress in disinflation. Robust economic growth returned and free movement of capital has been authorized. As a result, these countries started to attract foreign capital and some of them (Czech Republic in 1997 and Slovakia in 1998) experienced speculative attacks against their currencies. In addition, these economic developments have been accompanied by political turmoil and important social pressures. The modern literature on the choice of the exchange rate regime provides additional criteria which might explain more adequately the exchange rate strategies in CEECs.
These new criteria have been used in the literature to determine the choice of the exchange rate regime. Some authors applied them to large samples of countries (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 2002, Edwards 1996 , Poirson 2001 . Others limited their analysis to emerging economies (Collins 1996, and Calvo and Mishkin 2003) . However, few economists analyzed the problem of the choice of exchange rate regime in CEECs. Corker et al. (2000) , Backé (1999) and Nerlich (2002) examine the exchange rate regime selection in some of the transition economies using a descriptive study. Bénassy-Quéré and Lahrèche-Révil (1998) and Boone and Maurel (1999) approach the question of regime selection in CEECs empirically, but only via OCA theory characteristics. Finally, this problem has been examined by Von Hagen and Zhou (2002) . They develop an empirical model of the choice of the exchange rate regime for a group of 25 transition economies in the 1990s. Their model tests for the relevance of OCA variables, financial development measures and crises variables to the selection of the exchange rate regime. Moreover, the authors assess the discrepancies between the de jure and de facto regimes in transition economies. However, they do not account for political conditions, which seem to be an important factor in the CEECs' selection of an exchange rate system. The objective of this paper is to investigate the main determinants of exchange rate regimes in CEECs, and the sources of differences between adopted strategies. First, we employ modern and traditional approaches mentioned above, and compare their capacity to explain the choice of regimes among CEECs. Second, we consider the choice of exchange rate regime according to the official (de jure) and de facto classifications. The discrepancies between them can indeed be the reason for misleading differences between exchange rate regimes in CEECs. We use both classifications, in a way that, to our knowledge, has not been done in the existing empirical literature. We include the category of hard peg in order to test explicitly for the "corner solutions" hypothesis. We embody our hypotheses in an ordered logit model for an unbalanced panel of ten countries.
The sample includes eight new members of EU i.e. the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. In addition, we supplement this group by Bulgaria and Romania, in order to diversify our sample. In fact, these two economies made less progress in transition to the market economy and stabilization of their economies than the eight new EU members. Our study is based on the period between 1993 and 2002. The reason for choosing 1993 as a start date is due to the unavailability of the data. In contrast with other work, our empirical study takes into consideration the most recent evolutions of exchange rate strategies in CEEC, stimulated by the perspective of joining the euro area.
The second Section describes the evolution of exchange rate strategies in CEECs and the discrepancies of de facto and de jure classifications in these countries. Section 3 reviews the theoretical hypotheses of different approaches to the exchange rate regime choice. In Section 4, we develop the baseline econometric model of exchange rate regime choice. The results of our estimations are presented in Section 5, and finally Section 6 concludes.
Regimes in Central and Eastern European countries

Evolution of exchange rate regimes in CEECs
The CEECs adopted rather diverse exchange rate regimes and monetary strategies since the early 1990s. Their monetary and exchange rate strategies can be divided into three phases following the challenges they were confronted with. Table 1 shows the evolution of officially adopted exchange rate regimes in ten CEECs.
During the first phase, between 1990 and 1994, the monetary authorities focused on stabilizing the economy. Most CEECs entered the transition process with a monetary overhang and experienced high inflation rates. In order to combat inflation, several countries initially opted for the external anchor in the form of pegged exchange rates. The Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, after the split of Czechoslovakia, on the 1st of January 1993, continued to fix their exchange rates to the basket of two currencies (Deutsche mark and US dollar). Hungary opted for a crawling peg tied to a currency basket (German mark and US dollar). Following a brief period of fixed rates at the beginning of transition, Poland officially introduced a crawling peg in 1991, anchoring its currency to a basket of two currencies (euro and US dollar). Estonia introduced a currency board arrangement in 1992, first to the German mark and then to the euro. Latvia and Lithuania initially opted for flexible regimes (managed float) but switched to pegged exchange rates in 1994. Lithuania, in particular, adopted a currency board with the US dollar as anchor currency. A few countries (Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia) initially adopted flexible exchange rate regimes, despite being confronted with high inflation rates. This might be due to the relatively low level of reserves that these countries held in the beginning of 1990s. 1 This lack of international reserves made it difficult to back a peg. Stabilization  1993  0  2  3  2  0  0  1  0  2  0  phase  1994  0  2  3  2  2  3  1  0  2  0  Transition  1995  0  2  3  1  2  3  1  0  2  0  phase  1996  0  1  3  1  2  3  1  0  1  0  1997  3  0  3  1  2  3  1  0  1  0  1998  3  0  3  1  2  3  1  0  0  0  1999  3  0  3  1  2  3  1  0  0  0  Preparation  2000  3  0  3  1  2  3  0  0  0  0  phase  2001  3  0  3  1  2  3  0  1  0  0  2002  3  0  3  1  2  3  0  1 This behavior is often referred to as the "fear of floating" phenomenon. Second, a country can manifest a "fear of pegging" behavior. This is the case when a country, claiming to have a pegged exchange rate, in fact carries out frequent changes in parity.
The approach taken here is, first, to report results according to the official classification, which uses the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.
In addition, we supplement these results by the de facto classification, based on the measure developed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) . In empirical work, the exchange rate regimes (both de facto and de jure) have been, as a rule, classified into three categories: peg, intermediate and float regimes. Recent literature, often, tries to assess whether emerging markets switch to the "corner solutions" 4 . This hypothesis, however, cannot be tested if hard and soft pegs form the unique category. This is because according to the " bipolar view" literature, one of the corner solutions is a hard peg. A soft peg is perceived as one of the intermediate regimes. A distinction between both is thus a necessary condition to investigate the "corner solutions" hypothesis. We follow this argument, and we distinguish in our study the soft pegs from hard pegs. The de jure exchange rate regimes are classified into four principal categories: hard peg, soft peg, intermediate and float regimes. They are presented in Table 1 . The hard pegs include currency boards. The soft pegs contain single currency pegs, SDR pegs and other narrow bands (less than ±1%) not being constrained by the strong commitment of the central bank. The intermediate category contains tightly managed and broad band exchange rate systems (at least ±1%). Finally, the float category includes managed floats without pre-announced paths for the exchange rate and free floats.
The de facto regimes are also classified into four groups. We regroup the Reinhart and
Rogoff categories into four groups following the IMF definition of the regimes (Table 2) . We note from the compariason of Tables 1 and 2 that the there are no substantial differences between the evolution of the de jure and the de facto1 regimes. The main differences appear in the beginning of the transition period, when several countries announced more rigid exchange rate regimes than they used in reality. The Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic and Hungary announced pegs (Category 2 in Table 1 ), while in fact, they used the intermediate or floating regimes (Category 1 or 0 in Table 2 ). According to the de jure classification, Poland used the intermediate regime while in reality it let the Polish zloty float.
This phenomenon appeared when CEECs, using fixed exchange rates, were confronted with challenges which required a higher degree of flexibility. The central banks, however, have not built up yet sufficient credibility to adopt flexible regimes. Thus, during the stabilization phase, the floating regimes were more frequent in the de facto case suggesting a "fear of pegging" behavior. The country which manifested the opposite behaviour was Slovenia. In line with the "fear of floating" phenomenon, its currency was announced to float while its monetary authorities often intervened in the FOREX market (intermediate de facto regime in Table 2 ). This is because, in the beginning of the transition, Slovenia did not hold a high stock of reserves. Therefore, the intermediate regime could not be credible.
While during the stabilization phase the differences between the de jure and the de facto regimes were frequent, during the two following phases these two classifications significantly converged. The only remaining exception is Slovenia and the Slovak Republic, countries announcing pure floats and using intermediate exchange rate regimes. Thus, "vanishing middle" regimes are still used by these countries. In particular, as Table 2 shows, four out of ten countries currently employ intermediate regimes and during the whole sample period CEECs adopted twice more often intermediate regime in reality than they announced (Tables   5 and 6 in Appendix A).
Theoretical Determinants of Exchange Rate Regimes
Our analysis of the determinants of exchange rate regimes in CEECs is centered around four main approaches. The traditional approach is embodied in the theory of Optimum Currency Areas (OCA). The modern discussions on the choice of exchange rate regime include the impossible trinity view, the political economy view and the currency crises approach. These traditional and modern models imply a set of potential determinants of exchange rate regimes. We include ten of them as explanatory variables in the specification.
OCA Theory
The early literature, based on the theory of Optimum Currency Area (OCA) by Mundell 
Impossible Trinity
A key ingredient of the Mundell-Fleming framework is the assumption of perfect capital mobility. This implies international arbitrage across countries in the form of uncovered interest parity. From this model it follows that it is impossible to simultaneously achieve the three goals: exchange rate stabilization, capital market integration and independent monetary policy. This is usually referred to as "impossible trinity". The currency crises in Mexico, Asia, Brazil and Russia, and increasing capital mobility brought the "impossible 5 We use lagged values of these variables in order to minimize potential endogeneity problems. 6 We choose the EU as a benchmark for geographical trade concentration because this is the main trade partner of CEECs.
trinity" hypothesis to the forefront and resulted in the "bipolar view" of exchange rate In addition, the rapid process of financial deepening and innovation reduced the effectiveness of capital controls. Consequently, the traditional trinity dilemma has been reduced to the monetary policy-exchange rate stability trade-off. Moreover, countries with relatively undeveloped financial sectors lack market instruments to conduct domestic open market operations. Thus, low financial development should increase the probability of adopting pegs.
We assess the empirical relevance of the impossible trinity approach employing as explanatory variables a capital control index (Restrictions) and the ratio of private credit to GDP (Credit, a measure of financial development), both lagged one period.
Currency crisis
The early literature of balance-of-payments crises (Krugman 1979 ) stressed that crises were caused by weak "economic fundamentals", such as excessive expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. It shows that, under a fixed exchange rate, domestic credit expansion in excess of money demand growth leads to a gradual but persistent loss of international reserves and, ultimately, to a speculative attack on the currency. The process ends with an attack because economic agents understand that the fixed exchange rate regime will collapse, as it is inconsistent with current economic conditions. The empirical implication of this model is that expansionary monetary policy combined with a fixed exchange rate leads to external imbalances. As a consequence, a country experiencing a high rate of inflation might be reluctant to fix its exchange rate. Following this argument, we introduce the inflation rate differential (Inflation) into our specification. We use as a benchmark inflation rate the German inflation rate. We suppose that the German inflation rate is a good approximation of the European one, since in the 90's, European countries followed the monetary policy of the Bundesbank.
According to Krugman's currency crisis model, the collapse of pegged exchange rate is accompanied by a steady erosion of international reserves. In fact, the attack on a currency immediately depletes reserves and forces the authorities to abandon the parity. Thus, the level of international reserves has often been used as a leading currency crisis indicator. A 7 Intermediate regimes are all regimes except for the pure floats and the hard pegs. 8 See e.g. Fischer (2001) .
country willing to peg has to hold a high amount of international reserves to improve the credibility of its exchange rate arrangement. We examine the importance of the level of international reserves (Reserves as the ratio of international reserves to broad money) in the selection of exchange rate regime.
While this traditional approach stresses the role played by declining international reserves in triggering the collapse of a fixed exchange rate regime, some recent models suggest that the decision to abandon the parity or to choose a flexible regime may stem from the authorities' concern about the evolution of other key economic variables. It is important to note that fixed regimes provide more fiscal discipline than the flexible ones 10 . Therefore, there is a reverse relationship between the exchange rate regime and public deficit. On the one hand, the level of the public deficit may influence the selection of exchange rate regimes. On the other hand, the chosen exchange rate strategy will have an impact on the fiscal policy and thus the level of public deficit. In order to correct for this potential endogeneity problem, we used lagged values of the explanatory variable of budget balance 11 . We investigate the relevance of the public deficit to the choice of the exchange rate regime by using as a regressor the level of government's deficit as a percentage of GDP (Deficit). Again, all crises variables will be one period lagged. 9 The public finance convergence criteria impose a constraint of 3 % on public deficit and of 60% on public debt, both in terms of GDP.
10 See Giavazzi and Pagano (1988). 11 We realize that in a perfect foresight framework, this way of correcting for endogenity biais may not be a sufficient solution. It would be better to instrument the budget balance variable. Finding a good instrument for budget balance is, however, a very difficult task. In many studies (see for eg. Levy-Yeyati et al. (2004)), the authors use the lagged values of public deficit as instruments. This, however, does not solve the endogeneity problem in case of perfect foresight assumption.
Political economy
Numerous authors have emphasized the credibility gains of adopting a peg arrangement. 12 It has been argued that governments with a low institutional credibility, willing to convince the public of their commitment to price stability, may adopt a peg as a "policy crutch" to tame inflationary expectations. Accordingly, weak governments that are more vulnerable to expansionary pressures may choose to use a peg as an instrument to eliminate (or considerably reduce) these pressures. In addition, some authors argued that a fixed exchange rate disciplines the government because any fiscal excess may result in a currency crisis. 13 Collins (1996) and Edwards (1996) built their empirical models around a framework in which the political cost associated with a devaluation under fixed exchange rates plays a major role. While Collins did not directly use political economy variables in her analysis, Edwards introduced variables that measure the degree of political stability and the strength of the government. He finds that weaker governments and unstable political environments reduce the likelihood that a peg will be adopted. His results reflect the "sustainability hypothesis", contradicting "policy crutch" approach.
An additional, important political determinant of the choice of the exchange rate regime in CEECs is their political will to join ERM II. This variable, however, is difficult to measure, and does not necessarily reflect the real objective of the monetary authorities.
In order to investigate which political economy approach is appropriate to the selection of the exchange rate regime in CEECs, we follow Edwards (1996) and we employ two indices.
The strength of the government is measured as the fraction of seats in the lower chamber of the parliament held by the government's party or coalition (GovStrength). The second index (PolStab) focuses on instances where there has been a transfer of power from a party or group in office, to a party or group formally in the opposition. This index measures the stability of the political system since its value increases with the number of years that the party or a coalition is in office. 14 
Baseline model of Regime Choice
In this section we present the econometric model which is applied to test the hypotheses presented in the previous section, in a unified framework. We describe the choices of exchange rate regimes using a discrete variable, y i,t . Following our classification from Section 12 See the precursors Barro and Gordon (1983), Giavazzi and Pagano (1998) and Drazen (2000) . 13 See Aghevli et al. (1991) . 14 The detailes on the construction of this measure are included in Appendix B. 
where Z i,t is a vector of explanatory variables, N is the number of countries and T i denotes the number of observations for country i. The likelihood of belonging to these categories is defined in terms of probabilities of the values of an underlying latent variable y * i,t . We assume that the country chooses a flexible exchange rate regime when the latent variable is below a certain threshold level c 1 :
When the latent variable is between the two thresholds c 1 and c 2 the country adopts the intermediate regime:
If the latent variable takes values between c 2 and c 3 the country chooses the soft peg:
Finally, if the latent variable exceeds c 3 the country adopts the currency board arrangement:
These three thresholds (c 1 < c 2 < c 3 ) are estimated in our analysis along with the coefficients of the explanatory variables of the vector Z i,t . The probabilities of y i,t being classified as flexible, intermediate, pegged or hard peg are given by:
where F (x) = Pr(u i,t < x) is the cumulative probability distribution of the error term. We can assume here that the error term follows the logistic or normal distribution. Because the information criteria (Akaike, Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn) do not indicate clearly the superior model (probit or logit) for our data set, we assume the error term u i,t, to be i.i.d
with a logistic distribution function with a mean of 0 and variance of π 2 3 . Because the probit estimations provide the similar results, our arbitrary choice of logistic distribution does not have any negative consequences on the quality of this study. Since the values of the exchange rate regime variable can be logically ordered, this gives rise to an ordered logit. Accordingly, the probabilities of y i,t taking values 0, 1 , 2 or 3 are given by:
,
, where Λ(.) represents the logistic distribution function. The estimates of the coefficients of the vector Z i,t and the thresholds c 1 , c 2 and c 3 are obtained by maximizing the likelihood function using the Quadratic Hill Climbing algorithm.
The econometric literature on panel data models suggests to employ the specific fixed effects model, if one focuses on a particular set of countries. This is clearly the case of our study. However, the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) is inconsistent in the case of a country-specific fixed effects models (Chamberlain 1980) . As N tends to infinity, for a fixed T, the number of fixed effects µ i , for i = 1, ..., N, increases with the sample size N, and we have an incidental-parameter problem. This means that fixed effects cannot be consistently estimated for a fixed T. MLE is consistent when T tends to infinity. However, T is usually small for panel data (T=10 in our case). The biased fixed effects estimates, in turn, trigger inconsistency of the coefficient estimates. In case when we do not introduce the country specific effects, MLE is consistent for the coefficients of the model. Therefore, we pool all country-year observations and carry an ordered logit estimation.
The econometric results and their implications
In this section we empirically assess the importance of the hypotheses of the four approaches to the exchange rate regime choice in CEECs. We estimate the specification, for de jure and de facto classifications.
De jure exchange rate regimes
The results of de jure classification estimations are reported in Table 3 . A positive sign of a coefficient means that an increase of the associated variable raises the probability of adopting a hard peg. In order to facilitate the interpretation of the results, we also report the discrete changes in probabilities of choosing a hard peg (y=3), a soft peg (y=2), an intermediate regime (y=1) and a float (y=0), for significant coefficients. These changes are the differences in the predicted probabilities as one explanatory variable changes by one unit, and all the other regressors are held at their means.
We note that the model correctly predicts 65 percent of the de jure exchange rate regimes in CEEC. The results suggest that eight out of ten explanatory variables play a role in choosing the exchange rate regime in CEECs. The coefficient of the degree of trade openness (Openness) is significant and has the expected sign. More open CEECs tend to adopt more rigid exchange rate regimes. A one percentage point increase in the openness ratio increases the probability of choosing a currency board by 0.003, holding all the other explanatory 
65%
Notes:* z statistics significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1% a: The χ 2 value is defined as 2(L 1 −L 0 ),where the L 0 is the value of the log-likelihood function with only the constant term, and L 1 is the value of the log-likelihood function when all the explanatory variables are included. b: Since for ordered logit models the R 2 is meaningless, we report here an appropriate measure of goodness of fit, i.e. predictive power of the specification. This measure computes the share of regimes correctly predicted by the model. Row in italics reports unrobust result. The figure presents the relationship between predicted probability of adopting a currency board and the trade openness. The later is defined here as a share of the sum of imports and exports in terms of GDP. All the other explanatory variables are held constant at their means.
variables at their means. Figure 1 shows the effect of the trade openness on the probability of adopting a currency board. All the other explanatory variables are held constant at their means. It shows that the relationship between the probability that a hard peg is chosen and the degree of openness is not linear. However, we see clearly that the increase in degree of trade openness increases the probability of choosing a hard peg. The size of the economy (GDP) is also a significant determinant of the exchange rate regime. However, its sign contradicts the OCA theory. Bigger economies favor pegs. The robustness checks show that this result is due to the presence of the variable of trade concentration in the model. Since the latter is a ratio of exports to GDP, there is a high correlation between the size of the economy (measured as real GDP) and the trade concentration variable (Trade) 15 . When we run regression omitting the trade concentration indicator, the size of economy seems to be an insignificant variable. The coefficient of geographical concentration of trade keeps its significance and its sign, whatever is the specification used. We find that the coefficient of The larger the inflation differential (Inflation) with Germany, the larger the likelihood of adopting a fix regime. For each additional percentage point of inflation differential the probability of adopting a soft peg increases by 0.0006, holding all the other explanatory variables constant at their means. This result contradicts the currency crises approach. As mentioned in section 3.3, a country experiencing a high rate of inflation may be reluctant to fix its exchange rate. In CEECs, however, the fixed exchange rate was often used as an 15 The correlation between size of economy and geographical concentration of trade is 0.5. Table 4 reports the results of the specification of the de facto exchange rate regime. First of all, we note that there are few differences between the results of the de facto and the de jure regime specification. This is not surprising given the fact that the discrepancies of the two classifications are not substantial. 16 In the recent literature, many de facto measures of exchange rate regimes have been developed and they seem to differ one from the other 17 .
De facto exchange rate regimes
Therefore, in addition to the Reinhart and Rogoff regimes measures, we employ as well the As can be seen in Table 4 , two out of three coefficients of the OCA indicators are significant. Similarly to the de jure specification results, the sign of the coefficient of openness ratio (Openness) confirms the OCA hypothesis. As in the de jure specification, higher trade concentration (Trade) with the EU implies more flexible regimes in CEECs. Finally, the coefficient of the size of economy is not significant. This confirms our doubts about its contradictory significant sign in the previous specification. 16 See Section 2.2.
17 Frankel (2003) shows that Calvo's and Reinhart's measure of de facto exchange rate regimes differs considerably from the LYS classification. 
62%
Notes:* z statistics significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1% a: The χ 2 value is defined as 2(L 1 − L 0 ),where the L 0 is the value of the log-likelihood function with only the constant term, and L 1 is the value of the log-likelihood function when all the explanatory variables are included. b: Since for ordered logit models the R 2 is meaningless, we report here an appropriate measure of goodness of fit, i.e. predictive power of the specification. This measure computes the share of regimes correctly predicted by the model. An increasing inflation differential increases the probability of adopting a peg. A one percentage point increase in this differential increases the probability of adopting a soft peg by 0.0003, all the other regressors being held constant at their means. The foreign international reserves are significant determinants of the de facto regimes in CEECs. The international reserves, as mentioned in the previous section, increase the credibility of a peg. As expected, the higher the stock of international reserves in a country, the higher is the likelihood of adopting a fixed exchange rate. A country willing to peg has to hold a high amount of international reserves to make its exchange rate arrangement credible.
We already mentioned, in section 2.1, that CEECs which did not hold a sufficient stock of international reserves used flexible regimes. This empirical result confirms our previous observation.
Finally, the variable reflecting the strength of government (GovStrength) is significant.
It suggests that stronger governments have a greater tendency towards selecting a pegged system. The political stability coefficient is not significant in this specification.
Comparing the two specifications of the exchange rate regime, we see that the de jure and the de facto regimes do not produce very different results. The hypothesis of misleading official classification, as a source of different exchange rate strategies has to be ruled out.
Conclusion
The objective of this study was to identify the sources of divergences between exchange rate strategies among CEECs. We investigated two potential reasons for these divergences. First, we built an extended specification of the exchange rate regime choice. We considered the relevance of variables suggested by traditional and modern theories. Second, we employed two distinct classifications of exchange rate regimes, i.e. de jure and de facto. In order to test the validity of our hypotheses we used an ordered logit framework.
The estimations of both the de jure and the de facto specifications produced very similar results. This shows that the de facto exchange rate regimes in CEECs do not diverge considerably from what is announced. Thus, the difference of the exchange rate strategies among CEECs cannot be explained by the inappropriateness of the different classifications.
Hence, differences between the regimes are generated by a large set of determinants, the traditional ones and the modern ones. Since the variables used in our specification have very different units, it was impossible to assess the relative importance of these determinants.
We, however, distinguished indicators that guided the CEECs' choice of the exchange rate regime, between 1993-2002, and thus the sources of the differences between them.
Confirming the OCA theory, fixing is strongly associated with open economies. However, contradicting the OCA theory, a country is less likely to adopt a fixed exchange rate if its external trade is highly concentrated with the EU. Our interpretation of this result is that very open economies with high geographical trade concentration are more vulnerable to external shocks. These shocks make it more difficult to sustain pegs. Since open CEECs are more prone to choose fixed regimes, they choose it only if their trade is not highly concentrated.
A country experiencing a high inflation rate differential adopts a peg as an instrument of disinflation policy. This confirms the idea that CEECs used the exchange rate regime as an instrument of importing credibility. The international reserves, make more credible a peg, in line with "sustainabiliy hypothesis".
Financial variables also play a significant role in the choice of the exchange rate regime in these countries. First, the development of the financial sector favours floats in CEECs.
Second, financial openness favours pegs. Since the "impossible trinity" approach rules out a combination of intermediate exchange rates and open capital markets, more financially integrated countries switch to more rigid regimes (and ultimately hard pegs).
Finally, we find puzzling results concerning the political conditions in a country. On the one hand, the more politically unstable the country, the more likely is the selection of the rigid regime. On the other hand, stronger governments have a greater tendency toward selecting a pegged system.
Appendix A
Frequencies of exchange rate regimes The first column includes the values of dependent variable. The second column reports a count and a percentage (since the number of all the regimes is equal to 100) of the corresponding exchange rate regimes. The first column includes the values of dependent variable. The second column reports a count and a percentage (since the number of all the regimes is equal to 100) of the corresponding exchange rate regimes. 
Trade
Trade concentration with th EU measured as a ratio of export from CEEC to the EU to the total export (to the world) of a country.
(Source: Direction of Trade Statistics).
